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1.1 Presentation of the paper 
 
The Darfur crisis is a military conflict in the Darfur region, which is located in 
western Sudan and borders the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya and South Sudan, 
which seceded from the rest of the country on 9 July 2011 and became the youngest nation 
in the world. The conflict is primarily between a paramilitary militia called janjaweed 
and the different rebel groups that emerged in the region against the regime of Omar al-
Bashir, who seized power in a military coup in 1989 and has ruled the country until the 
military ouster on 11 April (The Economist, 2019). The beginning of the conflict is 
usually settled on on 26 February 2003, when 300 members of the Darfur Liberation Front 
(DLF) seized Gulu, capital of Jebel Marra in West Darfur (Collins, 2008). 
In scarcely the two first years of the conflict, from February 2003 to April 2005, 
1,965,858 people were displaced from Darfur and 396,593 were directly or indirectly 
killed as a result of the crisis (Guha-Sapir & Degomme, 2005; Coalition for International 
Justice, 2005; as cited in Petersen and Tullin, 2006). In addition to the great number of 
victims and people affected by the crisis, the importance and interest in analyzing this 
conflict is reinforced by the current affairs: the anti-government protests that began in 
December and have resulted in the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, who is under 
arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to the crimes allegedly 
orchestrated in Darfur, after 30 years of governance. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the investigation 
 
General objective:  
Describe and analyse the development of the Darfur Crisis from the beginning in 2003 to 
the present, that is to say, until current days. 
Specific objectives: 
In order to explain the crisis in Darfur, it is needed to analyse several aspects such as the 
stakeholders which participated in it and the consequences of this conflict: genocide, 
sexual harassment, and IDP phenomena, among others. At the end, the international 
community behavior in this crisis will be mentioned as well.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Evolution of the analysis on the crisis in Darfur 
 
The present analysis is a traditional historical research, which consists of the 
following chapters in order to respond to the objectives described above: ‘Historical line’, 
‘Internal stakeholders’, ‘Violence in Darfur’, ‘International bodies’ responses’ and 
‘Present days (2007-2019)’. Lastly and based on the conclusions drawn from the 
bibliographic research, the findings are exposed. 
In the historical line, focusing on the period of time from 2003 to 2007, the origin 
and the early years of the conflict are explained. With the aim of exploring in depth the 
human consequences of the crisis, issues such as genocide, sexual violence, refugee crisis 
and the IDP phenomena are gathered in ‘Violence in Darfur’ in a more detailed 
description. In the next chapter, the behaviour of the following organisms and states are 
presented: African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the Arab League, China, Russia and the US administration. Finally, an overview 
of the recent events is covered, from 2007 to the present, May 2019.  
Throughout the analysis, different kinds of sources have been consulted: original 
or direct sources and indirect or secondary sources. The original sources used in this paper 
are the resolutions on the situation in Darfur by supranational bodies such as the Security 
Council of the United Nations (UN), the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(AU) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). As indirect sources, books, articles in 
printed and online magazines, websites, online media and documentary films have been 
consulted. In such a way, and in order to elaborate a solid and clear text, all the mentioned 




This bachelor thesis, consisting of a bibliographic analysis of the crisis in Darfur 
from 2003 to the current days, is intended to corroborate five initial hypothesis that will 
serve to accomplish the established general and specific objectives. 
 For the purpose of studying the origin of the crisis in Darfur, the first hypothesis 
is focused the grounds on which the conflict erupted: The reasons underlying the crisis in 
Darfur are cultural and religious. In other words, the clashes among the different rebel 
groups —the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), the most remarkable in terms of power— and the janjaweed 
militia  were motivated by its cultural and religious differences. 
The second hypothesis is that the Government of Sudan is supporting the 
janjaweed militia. The conflict is commonly framed as the battle between the mentioned 
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rebel groups against the government of Omar al-Bashir and the janjaweed militia which 
aspired to defeat the rebel groups. This hypothesis points that the janjaweed is a 
paramilitary group which has the economical and operational support of the government. 
The third and fourth hypothesis are in line with the objective of examining the 
consequences of the conflict. Specifically, they are related to the alleged genocide and 
sexual violence perpetrated in Darfur; the hypothesis are that the violence  in Darfur can 
be framed as a genocide and that the victims are targeted in a different way depending on 
their gender. 
Lastly, the fifth hypothesis corresponds to the international behaviour on the 
Darfur conflict: the international community has failed to mediate in Darfur. The 
assumption is that the global bodies that tried to mediate and bring peace in the region 
during the different phases of the crisis were ineffective.  




The methodology employed in this end-of-degree work is a bibliographical 
revision on the crisis in Darfur in order to describe and analyse the development of the 
conflict from 2003 to recent days. As stated before, both original and secondary sources 
have been consulted throughout the elaboration of the work. 
First of all, a bibliographical revision of secondary sources was done for the 
documentation about the precedents, the origin and first four years of the conflict, that is 
to say, for the chapter ‘Historical line’. It is to be noted in this respect that the books  A 
History of Modern Sudan by Robert O. Collins (2008) and Sudán y Sudán del Sur. 
Génesis, guerra y división en dos estados (Sudan and North Sudan, war and division into 
two states) by Alfredo Langa Herrero (2017) were the base to understand the situation 
not only in Darfur, but also in the whole state and, at the same time, to draw a 
chronological timeline of events in Darfur that is included in the analysis.  
Once the scheme of events was made, the timeline was complemented with other 
secondary sources such as articles in printed and online magazines, books and 
documentaries and, on the other hand, original sources retrieved from the United Nations 
Security Council, the International Criminal Court and the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union. 
As a next step, a second bibliographical revision was conducted in order to cover 
more specific aspects of the conflict, such as the debate on the alleged Darfurian genocide, 
the use of the sexual violence as a war strategy and the positions of the internal and 
international bodies on the conflict. On this occasion, the sources consulted were used to 
write ‘Internal stakeholders’, ‘Violence in Darfur’ and ‘International bodies’ responses’ 
above all. 
In contrast,  the predominant sources used for the description of the ‘Present days 
(2007-2019)’ are news articles published in different media outlets. Mass media, such as 
BCC and CNN; local media such as Radio Dabanga, Sudan Tribune and Sudan Daily; 
and news agencies such as Reuters have been consulted, all of them in their online 
version. The reason why this type of source is more prevalent in this chapter is that there 
is more information about the current situation in online media. Event so, recent reports 
have been consulted as well, such as the report by the Security Council of the United 
Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur published on 
10 April 2019. 
Furthermore, based on the information gathered in the previous chapters, the five 
hypotheses raised in the theoretical framework have been confirmed or refuted at the end 
of the paper and a brief description of the current situation has been included.  
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4. HISTORICAL LINE 
Precedents in the independent Sudan 
Sudan obtained its independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom on 1 
January 1956. Ismail Al-Azhari was its first Prime Minister until the Umma Party, led by 
Abdallah Khalil, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), led by Sayyid Ali al-
Mirghani, formed a coalition government in July. The coalition was restored on March 
1958, but the parliamentary regime was put to end by the army coup of General Ibrahim 
Abboud; while the regime of Abboud was ousted by the ‘October Revolution’ in 1964 
(Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005).  
In the late 50s and early 60s, “political tension, local violence and government 
suppression escalated in the Southern Sudan”, which turned into a civil war in 1965 
(Rolandsen, 2011: 211). On April 1965, The National Union Party–Umma coalition 
under the leadership of Mohammad Ahmad Mahjoub formed the government: however, 
due to discrepancies within the coalition, several regimes were settled until Yaffar al-
Numeiry seized power in a military coup in 1969 (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005). 
Yaffar al-Numeiry formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) after the 
coup. At first, his regime adopted a “ radical stance” through the ‘Sudanese Socialism’ 
(Karim, 1988: 41). According to Karim (2017), Numeiry negotiated £S32 million valued 
loan agreements with the socialist countries —Soviet Union, East Germany, the 
Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China—; but when Hashim 
al-Atta and some other sixteen Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) were executed after a 
failed coup in 1971, the relations with the Soviet block deteriorated.  
It is to be noted that even though he interrupted the civil war for 10 years by 
signing the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, he induced the second civil war by 
abrogating the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the imposing the Islamic 
fundamentalist Sharia Law (Assefa, 1990). 
In 1985, Numeiry was overthrown by a group of military officers led by 
Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, who took the power of the 
country until the 1986 elections, in which Sadiq al-Mahdi became the new President 
(Gravelle, 1998). The democratically elected government of al-Mahdi finished on 30 
June 1989 with the coup led by Omar al-Bashir, who established the first Islamic republic 
(Gallab, 2008). according to Gallab (2008), Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the National 
Islamic Front (NIF), was the primary strategist of the Islamist republic. 
 
Historical background in Darfur 
During the 1990s, the Islamists aligned with the regime of Turabi were backed 
by the Arab-Muslim urban elites in Darfur, but not by the Muslim rural groups such as 
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the Fur and the Masalit. The collaboration between Fur-Muslim rebels and the Christian-
Animist was seen as a danger by the Khartoum authorities (Daly, 2017; Johnson, 2011; 
as cited in Langa 2017). As a result of the addressed factual hazard, the region was 
divided in three different states in 1993 —North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur— 
as a way of weakening the local power of the Fur in Darfur (Daly, 2007; De Waal, 2007; 
as cited in Langa, 2017). 
In early 2000, an anonymous work known as ‘The Black Book’ denounced the 
hegemony of the Northern Region over the other regions. ‘The Black Book: Imbalance 
of Power and Wealth in the Sudan’ is a mysterious book that was first distributed  at  gates  
of  major  mosques  in  Khartoum  and soon after photocopied all around Sudan, becoming 
“the most talked about document in the country” (Seekers of Truth and Justice, 2004).  
As explained by Langa (2017), ‘The Black Book’ was launched at a time of rising 
tension in Darfur, specifically, in the midst of this crisis pro-Bashir and pro-Turabi, the 
President of Sudan since 1993 and the leader of the opposition party, respectively. 
According to the Seekers of Truth and Justice (2004), some of the activists that were 
involved in the preparation of the book fought against the government in the Darfur 
Conflict. 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was created  after  the  radicalization  
of Arab-Muslim elites in Darfur and its principles are close to the ideas contained in the 
‘Black Book’, in the words of Langa (2017). The authors of the book describe the 
document as a reveal of the injustice lived in Sudan since the independence of the country 
(1956), on the grounds that the successive Sudanese governments had privileged the 
Northern Region (Seekers of Truth and Justice, 2004). 
More precisely, they reported the political dominance of two politically oriented 
and powerful religious houses by selecting leaders from those “religious sects”. Those 
criticised houses were the house of the Mahdis and the house of the Mirghanis —led by 
Sadiq al-Mahdi  and Ahmed al-Mirghani, who had been Prime Minister and President of 
Sudan, respectively—, which corresponded to the Umma Party of the Mahdis and the 
Democratic Unionist Party of the Mirghanis. At the same time, they condemned the 
export of electoral candidates arguing that “important party members from the centre 
were encouraged to stand for elections in areas other that than own” (Seekers of Truth 
and Justice, 2004). 
 
Start of the clashes between rebel groups and militias 
The rebel groups against the government initiated their criminal activity on 26 
February 2003, when about 300 members of the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) —later 
renamed the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)— seized Gulu, the capital of 
Jebel Marra Province in West Darfur, and assaulted police and army posts in different 
directions. The rebel groups retired to their training camps in Jebel Marra after the attack, 
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but returned two weeks later in a firefight that resulted in the killing of 195 government 
soldiers and the flee of the garrison (Collins, 2008). 
Barely one month later, united forces of the JEM and the SPLM/A seized the 
capitals of South Darfur and North Darfur, Nyala and Al-Fashir respectively (Langa, 
2017). One may think that janjaweed militia assaults on villages were a response to defeat 
rebel groups, however,  according  to  Collins  (2008),  the  paramilitaries  commenced  
the  ethnic cleansing in October 2002 in Southern Darfur, where nearly 5,000 janjaweed 
militiamen were equipped and trained by the Sudanese army in their camps of Jabal 
Kargu, Boni and Idalghanam. 
In the ‘Political Declaration’ of the SLM/SLA released to the media on 23 March 
2003, the Secretary General of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Army, Minni Arkou 
Minnawi, stated to the media that the region of Darfur “had been an independent state 
from the sixteenth century to the second decade of the twentieth, when it was coercively 
annexed to modern day Sudan” (SLM/SLA, 2003). 
In   the   words   of   Minnawi,   the   Secretary   General   of   the   rebel   group,   
the post-independence regimes in Khartoum are characterized by “the policies of 
marginalization, racial discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and divisiveness” 
conducted  by  both  civil  and  militaries.  In  that  context, the head of the rebel group 
claimed that the genocide sponsored by the Central Government in Darfur “left the 
people of Darfur with no other option but to resort to popular political and military 
resistance for purposes of survival”. The objective of SLM/SLA was to create a “united 
democratic Sudan” in terms of equality, development, cultural and pluralism as well as 
moral and material prosperity for all the civilians, in order to which they proposed a 
decentralized form of governance through a federal or confederal system (SLM/SLA, 
2003).  
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), for its part, proposed to implement a 
federal system for six Sudanese regions: the Central Region, the Northern Region, the 
Southern Region, the Eastern Region, Darfur Region, Kordofan Region and the national 
capital, Khartoum, which would be considered as one more region. In particular, the rebel 
group led by Khalil Ibrahim from 2000 to 2012 advocated in that document that all of 
those regions should participate in governing Khartoum, and occupy the federal public 
positions as well as the enrollment for the recruitment in the armed forces “in accordance 
with the population proportion for every region” (JEM, 2005). 
Meanwhile, Khartoum Government’s military campaign in Darfur was built upon 
three measurements; the janjaweed, the Air Force and the military intelligence, whose 
aim was to terrify the civilian population and force their displacement (Langa, 2017). 
Alfredo López Langa (2017) claims, according to Daly (2007), that the janjaweed 
militias replenished their ranks with both criminal and  convict members, since the 
leaders of different armed groups arrested by Suleiman were discharged. Ibrahim 
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Suleiman had been chosen to be the chairman of the Restoration and State Authority and 
Security in Darfur by Bashir on 2002 (Flint and De Waal, 2008). 
As stated in the ‘Impunity Report’ of the feature ‘Five Years On’ by Human 
Rights Watch (2008a), and based on an interview made by the NGO in a refugee camp 
in Chad on 27 June 2005, even though the Sudanese government described the militia 
activity in Darfur as unorganized, many of the “militias used in the government’s 
campaign were highly structured”. The non-profit organization reported that the 
governor apparently met the tribal leaders on a nearly daily or weekly basis. The 
janjaweed militia can be portrayed, after all, as a “paramilitary oriented force with a 
hierarchical structure, supported and in service of the interests of Khartoum” (Flint and 
De Waal, 2007; as cited in Langa 2017: 104). 
 
First attempts of ceasefire 
In the words of Robert O. Collins (2008), within a few days of the Sudanese 
Liberation Army in Gulu, the security committee of the government for Western Darfur 
begun negotiations with the SLM and almost arranged a ceasefire, but it failed due to two 
facts. The first one was the murder of the Masalit leader Shaykh Salih Dakoro by an Arab 
militia on 18 March 2003 near Geneina (West Darfur), while the second was the resulting 
destruction the town of Karnoi (North Sudan) in the hands of a Sudanese air force Hind 
helicopter, against which the SLA retaliated the “strategic Masalit town of Tiné”, located 
in the Chad frontier, on 25 March (Collins, 2008: 288).  
Exactly one month later, on 25 April 2003, a combined SLA-JEM force attacked 
the El Fasher air base which, according to Rodman (2008: 541), alarmed Khartoum since, 
in the middle of a debate about the possible independence of the south, the hit-and-run 
attacks could mean a “risk of secession and political disintegration”. Rodman (2008) 
explains that, consequently, the government was committed to wipe the rebel forces out, 
not only through the Sudanese army and air force but also recruiting Arab tribal militias 
to join the janjaweed. 
During the following months, both the government and the rebel militias gained 
valuable territory. The SLA beat a Sudanese battalion in the north of Kutum, with the 
result of 500 deaths and 300 prisoners, in late May; attacked the town of Tiné again in 
mid-July, causing high losses, and seized large quantities of ammunition in Kutum on 
August. In the meantime, the janjaweed killed and forced the displacement of Fur, 
Masalit and Zaghawa and, in late August, the Sudan army defeated the SLA at the north 
of Kutum. It can be noted as well that the SLM/A signed a short-lived a ceasefire in 
September (Collins, 2008). 
According to Collins (2004), the JEM took by surprise a janjaweed column 
moving against the town of Tiné on 27 December, resulting in heavy losses, and, one 
more time, in January 2004, attempted to take Tiné inflicting over a thousand deaths 
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among government troops and rebel militias. Rothe and Mullins (2007: 87) state that the 
government moved the troops from the South of the country to the region of Darfur in 
December in order to “increase the strength of the military forces on the ground”.  
At that time, a 10.3 million dollar relief fund from UNHCR was supposed to be 
destined to Darfur, but the masses of refugees remained unabated (Prunier, 2005; as cited 
in Rothe and Mullins, 2007). In barely one year, by February 2004, about 30,000 people 
were killed; a million people had to abandon their homes and, in consequence, became 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); and another 200,000 fled to Chad (Collins, 2004). 
In mid-February, Bashir declared that the security forces had crushed the rebel 
groups and, thus, offered amnesty to the SLA and the JEM, after Khartoum began a major 
military offensive against the rebels at the start of February. One month later, opposition 
leader Hassan al-Turabi was arrested as “the government claimed that Turabi was behind 
an attempted coup, although officials in Khartoum seemed to back away from that claim” 
(Dagne, 2004: 2). 
 
Global sight to the crisis by NGOs 
‘Too Many People Killed for No Reason’, a report published by Amnesty 
International on 3 February 2004, “expressed the emotions of the international 
community” about the conflict in Darfur (Collins, 2008: 290). In the document, the NGO 
claims that, in accordance with the information available to the organization, “the prime 
responsibility for the grave human rights abuses committed against civilians lies with the 
Sudanese government and militia aligned to” (Amnesty International, 2004a:3). 
Apart from exposing and making visible the atrocities committed in Darfur, 
Amnesty International called on the government in order to mediate in the conflict, even 
before the rebel groups took up arms. They first called the government in January 2003 
“to resolve the deteriorating situation by respecting human rights”, and proposed to bring 
the leaders of different ethnic groups into discussions (Amnesty International, 2004a: 6).  
The aim of their second call, in February, was to request an independent and 
impartial Commission of Inquiry for the violence and human rights abuses, but the 
government did not reply. In the same way, they called in April, without success, for an 
International Commission Inquiry and for a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team due to 
the lack of “independent and impartial investigations into human rights abuses or 
deployment of international observers in Darfur” (Amnesty International, 2004a: 6). 
Collins (2008) explains that all respected international humanitarian organization 
were reporting the conflict and, in one form or the other, diplomats, aid workers and 
media began to describe the catastrophe in Darfur using the term ‘ethnic cleansing’. For 
instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross published in October 2004 ‘Food-
Needs Assessment: Darfur’ and the US Agency for International Development ‘Projected 
Mortality Rates in Darfur, 2004-2005’. Regarding the foreign administrations, Langa 
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(2017) mentions that the US had an active front in Iraq at that time, and that is why they 
did not pay attention to Darfur until later. 
 
In pursuit of a peace agreement 
In the words of Collins (2008), Iddris Déby, President of Chad, offered to mediate 
in N’Djamena (capital of Chad) in late March, since he was concerned about the fact that 
the violence in Darfur could spill into his country. As stated above, about 200,000 people 
had fled from the region of Darfur to Chad in one year, and the situation might have 
deteriorated even further. 
On 7 April 2004, both the SLM and JEM disavowed a forty-five-day agreement 
to seek a comprehensive solution “claiming their delegations had exceeded instructions”, 
which pointed out the internal crisis of the rebel groups: tensions between Zaghawa and 
Fur/Masalit within the SLM and, on the other hand, disagreements between the political 
wing of the JEM, led by Dr. Khalid Ibrahim, and Jibril ‘Abd al-Karim, his military 
commander accused of being in the pay of Sudan Military Intelligence (Collins, 2008: 
290). 
Just as what happened with the ceasefire proposed by the Chadian president Iddris 
Déby, the Khartoum government declined the humanitarian dialogue assisted by the 
Henry Dunant Institute in 2004 and, in this setting of  disagreement and dispute, the 
African Union (AU) managed to send a total of 132 monitors protected 3000 soldiers to 
establish the AMIS, the African Union Mission, in Sudan (Daly 2007; as cited Langa, 
2017). 
Boshoff (2005: 57) says that the AMIS mission was deployed “to contribute to 
securing the environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the 
return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee” and that, by 2005,  had 
deployed a force of 3,320 personnel: 454 military observers, 245 civilian police agents, 
26 international and Ceasefire Commission members, and 1,647 soldiers from Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Gambia, Senegal, Kenya, South Africa and Mozambique. 
On 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council adopted the resolution 1556 on the 
situation in Darfur. The previous resolutions were the resolution 1547 and the resolution 
1502 on the access of humanitarian workers to populations in need, both adopted 
unanimously on 26 August 2003 and on 11 June 2004, respectively (United Nations 
Security Council, 2004). In the case of the resolution 1556, it was passed with 13 votes 
for, 0 against and the abstention of China and Pakistan, which gave the Government of 
Sudan thirty days to disarm the janjaweed militia (Totten and Markusen, 2006). 
In the resolution 1556 of the United Nations Security Council (2004: 3), the  
Security Council welcomed the creation of the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) 
and not only demanded the disarm of the janjaweed militias, but also compelled 
Khartoum to “bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited 
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and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other 
atrocities”. Moreover, they called on the parties signing the N’Djamena Ceasefire 
Agreement of 8 April 2004 “to conclude a political agreement without delay” and 
welcomed the communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council held on 27 
July 2004 (United Nations Security Council, 2004: 3). 
The African Union had addressed to the international community through the 
Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2014: 2) in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, “to provide the much-needed humanitarian assistance to the civilian 
population affected by the crisis” as well as to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 
human rights violations committed in Darfur. 
A month later, the international news organization Reuters released a press 
statement called ‘Sudan rejects 30-day Darfur deadline’, published on 2 August 2004 in 
mass media such as Al Jazeera (2004), in which they reported that Mustafa Usman Ismail, 
the Sudanese Foreign Minister, condemned the 30 days deadline demanded by the UN 
Security Council through the resolution 1556. The Foreign Minister told the media that 
Sudan would “commit to implement the agreement that it signed on 3 July with Kofi 
Annan” and “the joint implementation mechanism which was set up to monitor this 
agreement” instead (Al Jazeera, 2004). 
Concerned that the Sudanese Government had “not fully met its obligations noted 
in resolution 1556 of the United Nations Security Council (2004) and the 3 July Joint 
Communiqué with the Secretary-General”, the Security Council of the UN adopted the 
resolution 1564 one month later, on 18 September 2004 (United Nations Security 
Council, 2004: 2). The Security Council called upon the government and the rebel groups 
to “work together under the auspices of the African Union to reach a political solution in 
the negotiations currently being held in Abuja under the leadership of President 
Obasanjo” (United Nations Security Council, 2004: 3). 
In relation to the disarm of the janjaweed militia, the UN reiterated that the 
Sudanese Government should bring to justice those responsible for the human violations 
and submit to the African Union “the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and names 
of those arrested for human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian 
law, with regard to its performance relative to resolution 1556 (2004) and the 8 April 
2004 N’Djamena ceasefire agreement” (United Nations Security Council, 2004: 3). 
By February 2005, the ethnic cleansing lead by the janjaweed was such that the 
humanitarian agencies and institutions across the globe declared it a genocide. In July 
2004, UN Congress approved a unanimous resolution declaring the ‘genocide’; even so, 
the US administration, the EU, AU, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference were more contentious (Collins, 2008). Not even the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) intended to deploy troops in Darfur, in the words of Collins (2008). 
On 30 July 2005, First Vice President Garang died in a plane crash, which, 
according to Brooks (2008: 420), “threw the SPLM into chaos” and made the political 
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parties speculate about how would the death affect to the government’s unity and to the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed on 9 January 
2005. Furthermore, the differences within the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army became 
more evident during the Abuja talks. As Collins (2008: 293-294) states, the “personal rift 
in the SPLM/A between Minni Arku Minnawi and Abdul Wahid al Nur had now become 
very visible after the failure of the first Abuja talks and, did not inspire the international 
community to proceed with an interventionist agenda”. 
The two main rebel groups in Darfur, the JEM and the SLM/A started to lose 
control “of their well-armed followers”, according to Collins (2008: 294), and as a 
consequence of the insecurity, the UN had withdrawn the majority of humanitarian 
personnel from that region by September, when the Abuja talks were not yet ended. 
Nevertheless, “under intense pressure from the international community and after a 
positive intervention by Chad”, the two factions of the Sudan Liberation Army  reportedly 
came to terms and opted to cooperate with the Justice and Equality Movement until, in 




Abuja talks and the Darfur Peace Agreement 
Brooks (2008) describes the negotiations of the Abuja talks, which began in 2004, 
as classic integrative approach. The African Union mediators worked with the 
government of Sudan and the representatives of the rebel groups to reach a “resolving 
formula” that would be relying on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 
January 2005 by the North and South of Sudan, and the Declaration of Principles which 
the Sudanese government and the Darfuri movements signed in July 2005 (Brooks, 2008: 
415). It was difficult to implement the CPA because “by the time the CPA was signed in 
Nairobi, international attention had already switched to the escalating conflict in Sudan’s 
western region of Darfur” (Daniel Large, 2001: 2).  
Both the African Union and the international community convinced the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement as well as the 
Sudanese government to fix the 30 April 2006 as the final date to reach a peace agreement, 
but, as midnight on 30 April drew near, the rebels refused to sign the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (Collins, 2008).  
In accordance with Brooks (2008), under the pressure of Robert Zoellick, 
Ambassador at the Cabinet of George Bush, and Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of 
Nigeria at that time, Minni Arku Minnawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 
2006, while Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur refused to sign. Brooks believes that the 
fragmentation within the rebel groups was the main reason why the Abuja talks were 
postponed. On the other hand, Collins (2008: 296) states that Dr. Khalil Ibrahim of the 
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JEM did not sign it either because the Justice and Equality Movement regarded that 
agreement “as only a partial, not a national, solution”.  
While implementing three protocols that were finally resumed in September 2005, 
the mediators in the Abuja talks would pay attention to “minimize the differences between 
Abdul Wahid and Minnawi”, which usually centred about the leadership of the group and 
the mechanisms to legitimate it (Toga, 2007; as cited in Brooks, 2008: 421). Nevertheless, 
even though the African Union mediators put efforts in representing the three parties in 
the several committees of the talks, they recognized Minnawi as the delegate of the SLM 
(Toga, 2007; Ismail, 2008; as cited in Brooks, 2008). 
As claimed by Collins (2008), after the Abuja Agreement was signed, some 
believed that, at least, the government and the SLM/A would end the slaughter and 
displacement of Darfuris and that the diplomatic pressure would persuade Abdul Wahid 
al-Nur in order to sign the agreement. In relation to the peace mechanisms, the attention 
was focused on transforming AMIS into a UN peacekeeping force. The initiative of 
converting it into a peacekeeping force was passed on 16 May 2006, by the Resolution 
1679 of the Security Council of NU, and received the criticism of the new Sudanese 
Foreign Minister, Dr. Lam Akol, who argued that the monitors of the Abuja talks had not 
mentioned such transformation in the agreement (Collins, 2008). 
More specifically, in the resolution 1679 (2006: 2), the Security Council of the 
United Nations requested the AU to agree with the UN, the Member States “on 
requirements now necessary”, both the regional and international organizations and the 
countries identified by the joint assessment mission of December 2005 in order to 
strengthen the capacity of AMIS. 
Bukerman and Rice (2006) reported in The Guardian on 1 September 2006 that 
President Omar Al-Bashir expressed in May his opposition to a UN peacekeeping force, 
arguing that the troops would face a “graveyard” and describing the plan on several 
occasions as an imperialist plot. In connection with Bashir’s opposition, throughout the 
autumn of 2006, the President “remained unmoved in the face of the intense international 
pressure from Kofi Annan, the Security Council, and delegations from the United States” 
(Collins, 2008: 298). 
A month after that resolution, on 30 June 2006, some of factions that refused to 
sign the Abuja Agreement —the JEM members and some SLM factions— formed the 
National Redemption Front (NRF) in Asmara, which, according Mariam Bibi Jooma 
(2006), consolidation reflected the intention of the rebel groups to achieve the demands 
that were not included in the peace agreement. Citing the Report of the Secretary-General 
on Darfur, S/2006/591, Jooma (2006: 10) reports that the new alliance admitted that they 
were the authors of an attack on Government positions, on 3 July 2006, in Northern 
Kordofan “widening the conflict beyond Darfur’s eastern border”. 
After the Abuja talks, three “catastrophic legacies” dominated the Darfuri scene, 
in the opinion of Collins (2008: 298): the “endless and frustrating” negotiations held by 
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the UN and the Bashir government regarding a UN peacekeeping force; the violence by 
the army and janjaweed, on the one hand, and the NRF, on the other, as well as by the 
“roving bandit gangs of former Chadian and Darfuri insurgents”; and, lastly, the decline 
of the humanitarian assistance. 
On November 2006, a high-level consultation of the African Union on the Darfur 
conflict at Addis Ababa “insisted that the AU’s mission in Darfur should continue” and 
that the AU and the UN should be the one to determine its size (Collins, 2008: 298). 
According to Collins (2008), this was subsequently ratified by the AU Peace and Security 
Council in Abuja on 30 November, which was later endorsed on 30 November by the 
Peace and Security Council in Abuja. In this regard as well, the President Bashir sent a 
letter to Kofi Annan, on 23 December, in which he said that he would support a “hybrid” 
force endorsed by the African Union and the United Nations (Collins, 2008). 
In any case, although it may seem that the humanitarian relief was in a more 
advanced phase, the fighting escalated to the extent that the humanitarian personnel had 
to be evacuated from Darfur. Aid organizations placed in Darfur started to withdraw as a 
result of the violence between the janjaweed and combined forces of the NRF and the 
SLA/Group 19 —the official name of the new SLM/A— since, as reported by Collins 
(2008), the fighting increased when the Sudanese army and the janjaweed were beaten 
by the NRF twice and, later, fought against the combine forces at El Fasher.  
As a result, as explained by Abiodun (2011: 200), the Government of Sudan did 
not approve until June 2007 the hybrid operation that had been formed by the United 
Nations and the African Union in December 2006 and  the “humanitarian efforts were 
also heavily hampered and haphazardly conducted”. 
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5. INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Two main rebel forces: SLM/A and JEM 
The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) are the two main rebel groups fighting in Darfur, which, according to 
Reyna (2010), emerged in response to the janjaweed militia that started operating in 
Darfur during the Arab–Masalit conflict in the early 1980s. The first was the Darfur 
Liberation Front (DLF), which later became the Sudan Liberation Army, in February, and 
then the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one month later (Reyna, 2010). 
As reported by Prunier (2008: 6), the two rebel groups are self-financed or receive 
“moderate amounts from regional sponsors” such as Chad and Eritrea. If one compares 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Peace Proposal for Sudan in General and 
Darfur by JEM (2005) and the Political Declaration of SLA.SLM by SLM/SLA (2003), 
can notice that both are moved by similar motivations: 
Concerning the distinctions among the Sudanese territories, as expressed in their 
Political Declaration, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army had had a favourable 
position regarding the unity of the State but underlined that it should be maintained as 
long as is “based on justice and equality for all the Sudanese peoples” (SLM/SLA, 2003). 
The guerrilla upholds the rights of self-determination and the free will, in a sense of 
“acknowledgement of Sudan’s ethnic, cultural, social and political diversity” (SLM/SLA, 
2003). The Equality and Justice Movement, for its part, refers in their Peace Proposal to 
the “stability and unity of the nation” when defending the adoption of a peaceful transition 
of power (JEM, 2005). 
In relation to the principles of human rights and democracy, the JEM (2005) 
indicates their commitment to human rights based on the international human rights 
conventions and treaties, defend the  freedoms of expression, association, formation of 
political parties and  non-governmental associations without any kind of discrimination 
and full basic rights for women and children; while the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army seems more conscious in this aspect and summarizes their main ideas 
by standing for “full realization and respect for human rights and democratic pluralism in 
accordance with international standards leading to equal development and the eradication 
of political and economic marginalization” (SLM/SLA, 2003). 
As explained above, the SLM/SLA (2003) proposed a decentralized form of 
governance, a federal or confederal system in which different regions would govern 
themselves autonomously and the richness of the state should be represented by its 
component regions; whereas JEM (2005) opted for a federal and democratic system for 
the six regions of Sudan, whose participation in the central power should be consistent 
with the population of each territory.  
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For the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army, that new system should create new 
democratic conditions for a “new view of the Sudanese identity based on Sudanism”, an 
equal and equitable distribution of power and wealth regardless of the place of origin, 
ethnic background and religion (SLM/SLA, 2003). Moreover, the SLM/SLA (2013) 
underlines that religion and politics ought not go hand in hand since religion belongs to 
the personal domain and politics to the public. Aware of the fact that Sudan is “multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious”, the Justice and Equality Movement advocates 
a distribution of power and wealth that reflects in a positive way the unity and diversity 
of the country as well, and specifies that a portion of that wealth should be invested in 
“the development and infrastructures of war-affected regions and areas” (JEM, 2005). 
Regarding the armed struggle, the SLM/A states that it is one of their “means to 
achieve our legitimate objectives” and see the need to form a programme of action with 
the other opposition armed and unarmed political groups; they appeal women to organize 
and find ways of supporting the groups and youth to join it (SLM/SLA, 2003). The JEM 
underlines the necessity of “restructuring of the armed forces in order to guarantee its 
national composition and orientation”, for which the enrollment for recruitment should 
be in line with the population of each region (JEM, 2005). 
 
Splinter groups of the SLM/A and JEM 
It is also worth noting that, since the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the 
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army was separated into factions. According to Prunier 
(2008), the main faction, ‘Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdel Wahid (SLM/AW)’, is led 
by Abdel-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur and just like the majority of the other factions is 
primarily Fur, but there are about a dozen of  SLM factions. 
The main factions that were created after the signature of the DPA are: the ‘Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM)’, led by Suliman Arcua Minnawi, 
who was the secretary of the movement before its split; ‘Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Khamees (SLM/Khamees)’, led by Khamees Abdallah —who is Masalit—; 
‘Sudan Liberation Movement/Ahmed Shafie (SLM/AS)’, lead by a founding member of 
the original SLM, Ahmed Abdel Shafie; ‘Group of 19 (G19)’, formed by 19 commanders 
of SLM/AW; ‘Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity (SLM/Unity)’, formed by G19 and 
SLM/MM members; ‘Sudan Liberation Movement/Free Will (SLM/Free Will)’, led by 
Abdel Rahman Musa; ‘Great Sudan Liberation Movement (GSLM)’; ‘The Group for 
Development’ and ‘Grievances and Mother of all SLA’ (Prunier, 2008). 
Apart from the Sudan Liberation Party,  Prunier (2008) also describes some 
splinter groups of JEM, a rebel group that is almost exclusively Zaghawa: ‘National 
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)’, founded by Jibril Abdel Karim Bari 
and part of the National Redemption Front (NRF); ‘JEM-Field Revolutionary Command 
(JEM-FRC)’ under the lead of Mohamed Saleh Harba and finally merged with the 
NMRD; ‘JEM-Wing for Peace (JEM-WfP)’, led by Abdelrahim Abu-Risha; ‘Darfur 
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Independence Front/Army (DIF/A)’, led by Mohamed Idris Azraq and characterised by 
being the “first movement which claims independence” of Darfur and ‘JEM-Collective 
Leadership (JEM-CL)’, under the lead of Abdallah Banda and Bahar Abugarda. 
 
Janjaweed militia and the Sudanese Government 
In the words of Flint (2009) the term ‘janjaweed’ is used as an insult by Arab 
tribes, meaning a “thief, someone who works for himself”. It is thought that it is a 
combination of the words jawad (horseman), Jiim (a G3 rifle) and jinn (devil) or that it 
was named after a notorious robber known as Hamid ‘Janjaweed’ in West Darfur in the 
1970s; but, according to Flint, those origins are “pure speculation” (Flint, 2009: 52). 
As stated by Langa (2017), The Sudanese Government has systematically and 
cynically denied the atrocities committed by the janjaweed alluding to the traditional 
tribal conflict among Arab and African tribes. In contrast, Human Rights Watch 
denounced the cooperation of the government with the militia as well as their impunity. 
As exposed in the documents published by HRW, the government of Sudan not only 
allowed their activities in Darfur, but it allegedly provided the militia the weapons (Flint, 
2009). 
Even though it could be an alternative impression, the janjaweed militia is 
characterised by its heterogeneity in terms of classes and ethnic groups. There were three 
types of janjaweed members depending on their status. As explained by Flint (2009), on 
a privileges pyramid, the ‘border guards’ would be on the top; they were considered the 
elite because they received a salary and have military IDs. The next would be the ‘PDF’, 
who would not have a salary, but a reward for every operation as well as uniforms, guns 
ammunition and food. In the lowest section, the ‘mustanfareen’ (reserves) were given 
nothing but uniforms and, besides, were recruited by force; if they refused they would be 
put in jail or fined five camels (Flint, 2009). 
Regarding the ethnicities within the militia, while the janjaweed is often described 
as an Arab group, some authors call that framing into question. De Waal (2007: 1040) 
explains that, at first, the Arab tribes remained outside the conflict until 2003 when the 
rebel groups “took the war to the east and south of Darfur”; he refers to the janjaweed as 
the main government proxy from a Darfur segment of camel-herding Arab tribes and 
Arab immigrants from Chad. 
The fact that the janjaweed militia emanated from a mainly Arab territory does 
not mean that there were no other ethnicities among the militiamen. Willemse (2005: 15) 
states that the janjaweed are usually portrayed as Arab nomads who have been armed by 
the government of Sudan and indicates that the strategy of recruiting Arab nomads was 
applied in consecutive regimen in the civil war; the author reports, nonetheless, that “it is 
not clear whether the Janjawiid are ethnically homogeneous, or include young men from 
diverse ethnic backgrounds.” According to Flint (2009: 23), the first “irregulars” to be 
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accepted in the training camps at El Fasher formed a mixed group with “included  several 
hundred members of the Tunjur tribe from the Kutum area”, a tribe which is “closely 
related” to the Fur. 
If the janjaweed had to be represented by one person, that would be Musa Hilal, 
the leader of the militia. The name of Hilal headed the list of suspected war criminals of 
the US administration (De Waal, 2004). On 25 April 2006, Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem 
was listed in the sanctions list of the UN Security Council Committee because of 
suspicion of international humanitarian and human rights law violations and other 
atrocities, since he was allegedly linked to the attacks in Aro Sharrow, Acho, and 
Gozmena in West Darfur (United Nations Security Council, 2018). Nonetheless, it is 
remarkable that he is not persecuted by the International Criminal Court. 
As reported by BBC (2017), Musa Hilal was arrested by the Sudanese authorities 
on 27 November 2017 after fighting with the Sudanese forces near his hometown in North 
Darfur. Hilal was released from by the government of Sudan when the conflict erupted in 
2003 “with the purpose to mobilise Darfuri Arab herders to fight the insurgency in the 
region” (Radio Dabanga, 2018a). 
Hilal had been appointed as President Assistant for Federal Affairs in 2008 and 
was part of the National Congress Party (NCP) until he announced departure from the 
Party in 2014 to establish a new political movement: the Sudanese Revolutionary 
Awakening Council (Radio Dabanga, 2018b).  
In the words of Ahmed Mohamed Babiker, the official spokesperson of the new 
movement, the commitments of the Revolutionary Awakening Council were: “securing 
human rights, power and wealth sharing, development and settling down of nomadic 
tribes, compensating victims of the armed conflict, reconciliation among Darfur tribes, 
dialogue, and legalizing status of Arab militias within a framework of security 
arrangements” (Sudan Tribune, 2014).
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6. VIOLENCE IN DARFUR 
The Darfurian conflict is thus characterised by international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law violations, by both the government militia and the rebel 
groups. Indeed, the Sudanese Government and their sponsored militia, the janjaweed, 
have been accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity by the 
International Criminal Court (International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
Collins (2008) explains that the pattern of destruction by the janjaweed was the 
same: they raped women, killed men and kidnapped or killed children. The janjaweed 
burnt the villages, seized the livestocks, torched the fields and destroyed the infrastructure 
scheme “to drive the African population from their ancestral land”, which the author 
defines as “ethnic cleansing for Arab colonization” (Collins, 2008: 289). 
In concordance with the data presented by Caddick (2015), approximately 
300,000 people died due to the hostilities or the starvation and diseases caused throughout 
the conflict; while more than 2.5 million people had been forcing displaced and, as a 
consequence, they had to live in IDP camps. Just in 2014, more than 400,000 were 
displaced from Darfur (Caddick, 2015). 
Only during the first two years of conflict, from 2003 until the end of September 
2005, 1.624 villages were destroyed in Darfur and 200,000 people fled from Darfur to 
Chad, and, by April 2005, 1,965,858 were displaced and 396,593 were directly or 
indirectly killed as a result of the conflict (Guha-Sapir & Degomme, 2005; Coalition for 
International Justice, 2005; as cited in Petersen and Tullin, 2006). 
According to the estimation made by Petersen and Tullin (2006), and based on 
178 witness’ statements and reports on the attacks 372 villages from January 2001 until 
September 2005, the 3% of the attacks were conducted by the rebel groups SLA and JEM; 
while the rest were committed by the janjaweed, the government forces or a combined 
force of the two previous ones.  
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Source: Petersen and Tullin (2006) 
 
As documented in a medical report based on the medical records from 325 patients 
at the Amel Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture (Nyala, South 
Darfur) from 28 September 2004 until 31 December 2006, the 89,8% of the patients from 
twelve non-Arabic-speaking tribes declared had been attacked by the Sudanese 
Government and/or the janjaweed militias. Among the asserted abuses, the 49.5% of the 
patients reported beatings, the 43.1% gunshot wounds, the 37.2% destruction or theft of 
property, the 29.9% involuntary detainments, the 9.7% being bound and 49.3% of women 
being sexually assaulted (Tsai et al., 2012). 
One may wonder what the international assistance could do to face the constant 
violation of human rights and to assist the victims. Physicians for Human Rights indicates 
that, according to the UN, about 85% of the 900,000 people affected by the conflict in 
Darfur could not access to humanitarian aid due to insecurity. On the other hand, 
Médecins sans Frontières denounced exposed in January 2004 that the IDP camps were 
located in unsafe areas, difficult to access by humanitarian workers, and with no shelter, 
food, nor sufficient access to water and latrines (Physicians for Human Rights, 2006). 
Moreover, in some cases, humanitarian workers were not welcomed by the 
government. As stated by Caddick (2015), Radio Dabanga, an independent Darfuri news 
channel, reported that when more than 200 women, adults and girls, had been raped 
allegedly by Sudanese government forces in Tabit (North Darfur) the government denied 
the access to all the NGOs that wanted to investigate the claims but to UNAMID. 
In some other cases, according to Amnesty International (2004b: 5), the IDP 
camps in Darfur didn’t accept food or other aid items because “that would make them the 
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target of further attacks by government sponsored militia”. For this reason, Amnesty 
International (2014b: 5) claimed that the delivery of aid should be “accompanied by 
robust measures to protect civilians, so as not to increase the vulnerability they already 
experience as a result of their displacement”. 
 
Race-based attacks, ethnic cleansing 
In general terms, the Darfurian tribes can be divided into two categories according 
to their ethnic identity: the Arab tribes, in one hand, and the African identity tribes, in the 
other hand. In Darfur, the three general African identity tribes are the Fur, the Zaghawa, 
and the Masalit, while the Rizeigat is the dominant Arab tribe; and, although there might 
be some noticeable variation in skin tones, all of them are black (Christian, 2013). 
Moreover, they all share the Islam and, even though some tribes have their own language, 
the most common language is the Arabic (United Nations Secretary-General, 2005). 
According to the United Nations Secretary-General (2005), the large majority of 
the victims in the Darfur Crisis have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Jebel, Aranga 
and some other tribes, all of them considered ‘African’ tribes. As explained later in this 
thesis, even though the ethnic differences are minimal, the victims were usually called by 
racial epithets according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2005). 
 As reported in ‘Access to Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence’ by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005: 38), the victims were called by 
racial epithets such as “slaves”, “Blacks” and “Nuba”, the name of a Nilotic person who 
lives in southern Kordofan “or other insults related to race, tribe and ethnicity”. 
Based on the Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the term “genocide” means “any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”, as such: killing 
members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (International 
Criminal Court, 1998: 3).  
In concordance with the Article 258 (e), ‘Individual criminal responsibility’, of 
the Rome Statute, one person shall be “criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” if, in respect of crime of genocide, they 
incite others directly and publicly to commit it (International Criminal Court, 1998: 14). 
The International Criminal Court (2005a) stated that, even though Sudan is not a State 
Party, the conflict was referred to them by the UN through the Resolution 1593 and, 
therefore, the ICC might exercise its jurisdiction whereby Bashir was the first President 
to be wanted and be charged for the crime of genocide. 
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The Sudanese Government officials, janjaweed and Resistance Front leaders are 
in charge of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity according to the ICC 
investigation that was opened in June 2005. In relation to genocide, the specifications are 
killing, causing either bodily or mental serious harm and intentionally inflicting on the 
conditions of life  each target group in order to trigger the physical destruction of the 
group (International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
 
International debate on the term genocide 
The ethnic cleansing was “so widespread and consistent” that it began to being 
called “genocide” by the humanitarian agencies but, by contrast, the UN, EU, AU, Arab 
League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and US administration appeared more 
“restrained”, according to Collins (2008: 292). 
As stated in the fact sheet ‘The United Nations and Darfur’, published by the 
Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information 
(2007: 4), Commission of Inquiry announced by the Secretary-General of the UN on 7 
October 2004 concluded that the Sudanese Government “had not pursued a policy of 
genocide”, but the militias and the force of that government had “conducted 
indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, 
destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced 
displacement.” 
As explained in the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 
18 September 2004 as well, the Commission found that forces and militias of Khartoum 
“conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging 
and forced displacement, throughout Darfur” and,  as they were committed on a 
widespread and systematic basis, they “may amount to crimes against humanity” (UNSC, 
2005: 3). That is to say, United Nations didn’t clearly frame it as a genocide but as crimes 
against humanity. 
Hagan, Rymond-Richmond and Parker (2005: 528) claim that if the crimes 
conducted in Darfur are considered a crime against humanity instead of a genocide 
“probably mean less in the collective memory than would a legal determination of 
genocide” and emphasize that genocides are crimes against humanity, “but not all crimes 
of humanity are elevated to the symbolic significance of genocide.” 
 
Dehumanization racial epithets 
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008: 877) define dehumanization as a 
mechanism that “imposes degrading attributes on both individuals and entire groups for 
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purposes of massive group destruction,” which, according to the authors, is a defining 
feature of a genocide. In the case of Darfur genocide, the dehumanization implied racial 
epithets such as “you are slaves, kill the slaves” and “this is the last day for blacks”, 
according to the survey interviews on black African villages conducted by Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond (2008: 876). 
As reported in ‘Access to Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence’ by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005: 38), the victims were called by 
racial epithets such as “slaves”, “Blacks” and “Nuba”, the name of a Nilotic person who 
lives in southern Kordofan “or other insults related to race, tribe and ethnicity”. A 
janjaweed defector interviewed in the documentary The Devil Came on Horseback (2007) 
states that, when they are given the orders to attack a village, the slogans are “Kill the 
slaves, kill the slaves”.  
Sarah Martin (2007), an expert on peacekeeping and sexual exploitation who has 
worked for Refugees International, reported that hose derogatory epithets were uttered in 
rape cases as well in threatening phrases such as “We are making you a lighter baby”. 
Those racist remarks and threats are evidences of how “the rapes were racially motivated” 
(Martin, 2007: 3). 
 
Rape as a war strategy 
“Unfortunately, the unacceptable reality is that today it is still largely ‘cost-free’ 
to rape a woman, child or man in conflict. Sexual violence has been used through the ages 
precisely because it is such a cheap and devastating weapon,” said Zainab Hawa Bangura, 
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
according the United Nations (2004). As stated in the press release published on 25 April 
2014, Bangura made those statements while reporting of wartime rape and other forms of 
sexual violence in conflicts in an open debate in the Security Council, in which she 
criticised that rapist are never brought to justice (United Nations, 2004). 
Martin (2007: 1) claims that the rapes were used as strategy by the Sudanese 
government and the janjaweed in Darfur “in their brutal counter-insurgency campaign”. 
Amnesty International (2004b: 10) reports in ‘Sudan, Darfur Rape as a weapon of war 
Sexual violence and its consequences’ that violence against women in Darfur occurred in 
a context of “systematic human rights violations against civilians” since the violations 
that the janjaweed and the Sudanese army perpetrate targeted men, women and children. 
The stigma against rape is especially strong in Darfur because it is a mainly 
Muslim area, as stated by Martin (2007) in ‘Ending Sexual Violence in Darfur: an 
advocacy agenda’. In concordance with the mentioned report, in most of the rape cases 
the victims were kept alive and sent back to their communities “often pregnant and 
literally scarred to mark them as raped” as an intent of breaking down the Darfuri culture 
and polluting the population (Martin, 2007: 2). 
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Rape victims and perpetrators 
In concordance with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2005), the rapists were either members of the Sudanese armed forces, law enforcement 
agencies or pro-Government militia in the large majority of the times when they were 
identified. The OHCHR condemns in the report that “the Government appears either 
unable or unwilling to hold them accountable” since, to that date, the rapists had not been 
taken to court, a fact that goes along with testimony of Bangura mentioned above (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005: 2). 
Regarding the victims of rape, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2005) describes the pattern of sexual violence as different in every region of 
Darfur; however, in most of the cases documented by the high reliability organizations in 
their monitoring activities, the victims were women and girls living in IDPs, camps for 
internally displaced people. According to the information provided in the report, in many 
cases, the rapes occurred when the victims had gone to collect firewood or grass or were 
travelling to a major town in Darfur to another, and they were gang-raped  (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005). 
In The Devil Came on Horseback (2007), a documentary film by Ricki Stern and 
Anne Sundberg, the same scene is described: women had to walk to gather firewood 
because there’s very little wood in and around the camps, and because the men who would 
leave the camps were in risk of being castrated or killed. That Friday, a holy ‘day of rest’ 
in Sudan, is the worst day since “all the policemen gather around” and there is “less traffic 
to protect the women”, and, for this reason, young girls are kept out of school on Thursday 
so that they can collect wood (Martin, 2007: 5). 
As documented in the previously mentioned report ‘Medical Evidence of Human 
Rights Violations against Non-Arabic-Speaking Civilians in Darfur: A Cross-Sectional 
Study’, one-half of the recorded assaults, alleged by 325 patients at the Nyala-based Amel 
Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture from 28 September 2004 
until 31 December 2006, took place in close proximity to IDP camps, 25% in the general 
vicinity of the camps and other 25% within 3 km of the camps (Tsai et al., 2012). 
 
Legal status of sexual violence in Darfur 
Sudan adopted in February 2015 various amendments to the 1991 Criminal  Act 
that changed the definition of the (Article 149) from a “sexual intercourse, by way of 
adultery or sodomy, with any person without his consent” (African Centre For Justice and 
Peace Studies, 2016: 3) to a “sexual contact by way of penetrating any part of the body 
or any object into the vagina or anus of the victim” in the following circumstances: when 
force, intimidation, or coercion is used; when there is a fear the use of violence, detention, 
psychological persecution, temptation, or abuse of power against the victim or other 
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people; or when is committed against a someone “incapable of expressing consent 
because of natural causes or luring-related or related to age” (African Centre For Justice 
and Peace Studies, 2016: 4). 
Before the change of law, rape was punished with 100 lashes and imprisonment 
for a term not more than 10 years, but, if the rape involved a case of adultery or sodomy, 
it was punishable by death (African Centre For Justice and Peace Studies, 2016: 5). 
Nevertheless, if the pregnant woman could not prove the rape, she could be under 
indictment for the capital crime of adultery, according to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2005). 
Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005) 
reported that many women refused to report the cases due to the fear of reprisals or 
discouragement of not being redressed and that, in some cases, rapes were not vigorously 
investigated by the Police, the treatment of the authorities was intimidating and 
confidential medical assistance was denied. 
On the other hand, as mentioned by the African Centre For Justice and Peace 
Studies (2016), the removal of “adultery” from the old definition can be interpreted that 
marital rape can be now prosecuted by the Sudanese law and, thus, it was not punished 
during the most violent years of the conflict. Nevertheless, it can be criticised that, by 
referring to “penetrating any part of the body or any object into the vagina or anus” the 
new definition doesn’t address the oral rape as a form of rape and that the issue of consent 
and age are not clear (African Centre For Justice and Peace Studies, 2016: 4).  
7. INTERNATIONAL BODIES’ RESPONSES 
African Union and United Nations 
The first global body that attempted to face the Darfur conflict was the African 
Union (AU) through the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which “institutionalised the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention”; lead by Alpha Oumar Konaré at the time, the AU 
intervened in the negotiation of the April 2004 Humanitarian Peace Agreement and 
intensified the AMIS, African Union Mission in Sudan (Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira 
and Jaganathan, 2015: 23). 
African solutions to African problems. Foreign actors such as the European Union 
and the US administration wanted the UN to take the lead in the Darfur crisis. On the 
other hand, African leaders were more favourable to the idea of the African Union leading 
those operations (Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira & Jaganathan, 2015). The underlying 
argument behind such is that “local initiatives are assumed to work more effectively than 
foreign or imported strategies that tend to ignore the local culture and realities”, according 
to Mansaray (2009: 36). 
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As stated by Boshoff (2010: 57), AMIS was deployed in Darfur in order to 
“monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 
2004 and assist in the process of confidence building”, but, at the same time, it pursued 
some other goals such as securing the environment for the humanitarian aid and ensuring 
that the internally displaced persons and refugees can return to their homes.  
Nevertheless, the deployment of AMIS was not as successful as expected due to 
a number of factors such as “the restricted mandate of AMIS, piecemeal cooperation of 
the Sudanese government, rebel activities, lack of adequate logistics and political 
divisions within the AU itself”; which exposed the limitations of the African Union as 
well as the fault lines within the global system (Mansaray, 2009: 37). Under the 
N’Djamena agreement —2004 Darfur Peace Agreement—, the mission should have been 
“consolidated by a stronger mandate, a more realistic concept of operations, larger 
numbers and better logistics, and better finance” (De Waal, 2007: 1041). 
 
International Criminal Court 
If the African countries opted for the African Union and some Western countries 
opted for the United Nations to intervene to establish the peace in Darfur, some European 
countries went for a third institution to approach the conflict: The International Criminal 
Court (Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira and Jaganathan, 2015). With the Resolution 1593, 
the Security Council of the UN referred the crisis in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC 
with 11 votes in favour of the resolution, 0 against and the abstention of  Algeria, Brazil, 
China and United States (United Nations Security Council, 2005). 
In short, the ICC investigations in Darfur opened in June 2005 and has worked on 
several cases whose suspects are officials of the Sudanese Government, janjaweed leaders 
as well as leaders of the Resistance Front allegedly involved in charges of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (International Criminal Court, 2005a). In the words 
of De Waal (2007: 1042), “there was no recent precedent for the UNSC deciding to pursue 
justice in advance of any workable peace process”; therefore, the crisis in Darfur got a 
special attention. 
Under the international law, the ICC members are required to cooperate with this 
global institution but, under the article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998), ‘Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender’, there are two cases in which State members are excluded of cooperating: when 
the requested state has to act inconsistently with the international law with with respect 
to the immunity of a state, the diplomatic immunity of a person or the property of a third 
state (98.1), and when the member state would violate a binding agreement that had 
signed before with another state if they cooperate with the ICC (98.2). 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
the international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person 
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or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of 
that third State for the waiver of the immunity (International Criminal Court, 
1998: 48).  
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to 
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender 
(International Criminal Court, 1998: 48).  
Since President Bashir was issued by the ICC on 4 March 2009, the president has 
travelled to neighbouring countries on more than one occasion. On July 21 2010, a few 
days after Bashir got the second warrant for arrest by the ICC on 12 July 2010 
(International Criminal Court, 2009), Omar al-Bashir travelled to Chad a member of ICC 
and, despite the pressure of  the ICC, the EU, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, Chad refused to arrest the president (Clarke, 2010; as cited in Barnes, 2011).  
The same happened on 28 August 2010 when the Kenyan Government stated that 
they would not arrest the president “because it would have been detrimental to the 
Sudanese peace process” (Borger, 2010; as cited in Barnes, 2011: 1610). Moreover, the 
African Union members —Chad and Kenya, among others— were instructed by the AU 
not to arrest al-Bashir. As a response, the International Criminal Court decided to inform 
the Security Council of the United Nations and the Assembly of State Parties, but the 
president visited to ICC member countries again in 2011 without any consequence; he 
travelled to Djibouti on 8 May 2011 and Chad on 7 August 2011 (Borger, 2010 and 
Clarke, 2010; as cited in Barnes, 2011). 
 
US administration 
Clinton administration officials, College students, Holocaust Survivors, Deep 
South Churches, African-American civil society and even Hollywood grandees joined the 
Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) on the basis that the situation in Darfur reached the 
magnitude of previous genocidal process, an argument to end the conflict, and framed it 
as ‘the new Rwanda’ (Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira and Jaganathan, 2015).  
Save Darfur Coalition is famous for its campaign during the Beijing Olympics in 
2008. As explain by Budabin (2009), when the US failed to convince the global 
community to intervene in Darfur, the advocates tried to denounce China’s army supplies 
by branding the Beijing Games as the ‘Genocide Olympics’. In fact, as reported in BCC’s 
Panorama: China's Secret War (2008), about 130 athletes wrote a letter calling for a truce 
in Darfur. 
In the opinion of Mansaray (2009: 36), although the genocide in Rwanda reach 
the 800,000 deaths in 1994 “under the watch of the international community”, labelling 
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the Darfur conflict as a promise of ‘never again’ is a “cliché that holds little value to the 
thousands of victims in Darfur”; since Darfurian people were being killed while the rest 
of the world was debating which label fit the crisis the better. 
In relation to the position of the administration, the first politician to label the 
crisis of Darfur as a genocide was the Secretary of State Colin Powell before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in Washington D.C. on 9 September 2004 (Collins, 2008). 
The Bush administration was reluctant to frame it as such because they were focused on 
Iraq and Afghanistan and, therefore, defended the “African solutions to African 
problems” idea; however, when AMIS started to be seen as an inadequate peacekeeping 
mission by Western countries, the US administrations was one of the states to insist that 
the African Union force should be replaced by a better resourced United Nations mission 
(Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira and Jaganathan, 2015).  
In accordance to the information published on the US Department of State (2015), 
the US administration participated in 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and 
supports the international efforts of the African Union. Regarding the US policies in 
Sudan, they are focused on  “achieving a definitive end to gross human rights abuses and 
conflicts, including in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan”. One of their aims is to 
ensure that “Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists”; which is 
related to the fact that in 1993 Sudan was designated as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ 
(U.S. Department of State, 2015). 
 
China, Russia and the Arab league 
As reported by Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira and Jaganathan (2015), unlike other 
countries which condemned the Sudanese Government for perpetrating atrocities in 
Darfur, the Arab League and the Russian Federation claimed that the violence was more 
complex than the narrative that presented the Arab militias as perpetrators and the African 
civilians and rebels as victims; for that reason, when addressing this conflict, they were 
in favour of a peace-building process instead of an intervention. Nevertheless, Beijing 
and Moscow stated that the United Nations “was the right forum to handle the Darfur 
conflict” if the Government of Sudan and the African United felt overwhelmed 
(Verhoeven, Soares de Oliveira and Jaganathan, 2015: 27).  
According to Human Rights Watch (2008b), both China and Russia have 
supported the Government of Sudan because they share ideological commitments such as 
non-interference in internal affairs, but also for economic interest. China “imports 
between 4-7 percent of its oil from Sudan” and, furthermore, the Sudanese Government 
trades military supplies with China, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, among other countries 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008b). 
In practice, there were contradictions between principles of non-interference, 
mutual respect and mutual benefit adopted by China and the impact of those in wartime, 
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but the President Bashir has claimed, in more than one occasion, that China has been a 
true friend of Sudan, referring to the fulfilment of those three principles (Large, 2008). 
In Panorama: China's Secret War (2008), the reporter shows a number of trucks 
that were imported from China to Darfur the 2005 UN arms embargo that forbids those 
kind of transfers and considers them a “ first categorical proof” of the arms embargo 
violation by China. As reported by Hilary Andersson (2008) in BBC News, the TV 
programme not only found imported lorries from China, but the communication media 
was told that the Asiatic country was pilots who would pilot Chinese A5 Fantan fighter 
jets in Darfur. 
On the other hand, when the United Nations Security Council voted in April 2006 
for targeted sanctions, such as banning travels and freezing their foreign banks, on a 
former Sudanese military commander, a janjaweed militia leader and two rebel 
commanders, the UN Sanctions Committee failed the sanctions because China, Russia 
and Qatar objected (Human Rights Watch, 2008).  
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8. PRESENT DAYS (2007-2019) 
One may think that after the Sudanese Government passed in June 2007 the hybrid 
operation formed by the United Nations and the African Union in December 2006, the 
conduct of Khartoum would be less repressive in favour of peace and stability. On the 
contrary, the government of Sudan perpetrated massive air strikes on different areas of 
the three Darfur states that supposedly were controlled by rebel forces and their militias 
committed large scale attacks on villages in 2007 and 2008 and, meanwhile, forces linked 
to SLA-Minni Minawi, who had signed as well the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, 
carried our abuses against civilians in North Darfur (Loeb et al., 2010). 
According Human Rights Watch (2008b) and the other authors of ‘Darfurian 
Voices’, the janjaweed were incorporated into Border Intelligence, Popular Defence 
Forces and Central Reserve Police and other ‘“official” government security forces’ over 
2008 and 2009; nonetheless, some members of the militia conducted outbreaks of 
violence in El Fasher in April 2008, resulting in 15 deaths, while some other changed 
sides and joined the rebel groups because of the lack of payments. In fact, Mohamed 
Hamdan, leader of the janjaweed militia, “briefly made an alliance with both the SLA 
and JEM, before reaching a new agreement with the government.” (Human Rights Watch, 
2008b). 
 
International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants 
One significant date for Darfurians and the international community was 14 July 
2008, when the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo presented in The Hague evidences 
of the criminal responsibility of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in relation to 
10 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. As said by the 
Prosecutor, Bashir implemented a plan to destroy in considerable part the Fur, Masalit 
and Zaghawa groups by reason of their ethnicity; he first tried to defeat the rebel armed 
groups and, after, he pursued the civilians (International Criminal Court, 2008). Those 
evidences were exposed three years after the UN referred the case to the ICC through the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593; a resolution adopted by 11 in favour 
and four abstentions: Algeria, Brazil, China and United States (United Nations Security 
Council, 2005). 
The following year, on 4 March 2009, the ICC published the ‘Decision on the 
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir 
for the alleged responsibility of the President of Sudan for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes under article 25(3) (a). Concretely, he was accused of taking part in hostilities, 
pillage, murder, extermination, rape, torture and forcible transfer as crimes against 
humanity, within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(i), 8(2)(e)(v), 7(l)(a), 7(l)(b), 7(l)(g), 
7(1)(f) and 7(l)(d) of the Rome Statute, respectively (International Criminal Court, 2009). 
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Although the State of Sudan is not a is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Pre-
trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court “emphasises that the State of Sudan 
has the obligation to fully cooperate with the Court”, as stated in the Decision. In 
agreement with the Resolution 1593, the Chamber considers it is an obligation of the 
Government of Sudan to “cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to 
the Court”, over any other that Khartoum may had signed or accepted through any other 
international agreement (International Criminal Court, 2009). 
As a response to the arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir by the 
International Criminal Court, Higginbotham (2013) explains that the Justice and Equality 
Movement retired from the Doha peace talks —between the JEM and the Sudanese 
Government— hosted by the Government of Qatar and mediated by the AU/UN Joint 
Mediation Support Team. The negotiations between the two factions were restarted again 
in early 2010, resulting in the signature of “a framework agreement in February 2010 that 
pledged power- and wealth-sharing, restitution for victims, a two-month ceasefire, and 
the release of JEM prisoners”, but JEM withdrew from all negotiations in June, according 
to Higginbotham (2013). 
Based on data from 542 villages in southwestern Darfur (about 786,000 civilians), 
Olsson (2010) reported that, to the date, the total population had diminished by about 25 
percent; the civilian population from the three rebel tribes —Fur, Zaghawa, and 
Masalit— decreased by 57 percent, while the Arab and other African tribes that didn’t 
belong to rebel groups increased. As described by Olsson (2010: 387), those ‘non rebel’ 
groups settled in peripheral villages “with relatively good soils and access to water and 
where many rebel tribe households have been displaced.” 
 
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 
January 2011 began with the referendum to determine whether South Sudan 
should separate from the rest of the country. On 7 February 2011, the results showed that 
South Sudan voted to secede from the north, in fact, the 98.83 percent voted for the 
independence, as reported by McDoom (2011) in Reuters. Five days after the new nation 
was proclaimed, on 14 July, a decisive agreement was signed in North Sudan: the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), more known as the Darfur Peace Agreement. 
The agreement signed by the Sudanese Government and the Liberation and Justice 
Movement became the “framework for the comprehensive peace process in Darfur” in 
terms of power and wealth sharing, human rights, justice and reconciliation, 
compensation and return, and internal dialogue among other aspects (United Nations 
Security Council, 2011). 
As explained before, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) abandoned the 
negotiations before and refused to sign, but the JEM was not the only rebel group that did 
not sign this second peace agreement that would reaffirm the clauses stipulated in Abuja 
in 2006. The SLA-AW, the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid al 
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Nur refused to negotiate time and again since 2006; while the only movement to sign the 
DPA in 2006, the SLA-MM, led by Minni Minnawi, returned to rebellion in late 2010 
(Tubiana, 2013). 
The year 2011 ended with the Government forces killing Khalil Ibrahim, rebel 
leader of JEM, on 25 December. As reported in Sudan Tribune (2011), the JEM leader 
was injured in North Kordofan State, in clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) and his forces, on road to South Sudan. The spokesman of JEM, Gibreel Adam 
Bilal, denied to Sudan Tribune (2011) the allegations of Osmar Kibir, North Darfur’s 
governor, who stated that JEM’s forces had attacked around 20 villages in that area. 
Ibrahim had returned to Darfur from Libya after being in exile from May 2010, 
when “his group boycotted peace talks with the Sudanese government in Doha” (Sudan 
Tribune, 2011). Radio Dabanga (2011) published an interview in which Ibrahim told the 
media that he was being treated as a political prisoner in Libya, trapped “in a room in 
Tripoli for more than a year”, and that the security services and the intelligence of Sudan 
persecuted him in order to kidnap him. 
As reported by Mark Tran (2012) in The Guardian, the situation in Darfur was 
persecuted by the tension between North and South Sudan since the Darfur rebel groups 
became allies with the rebels of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan and, on the other hand, 
North Sudan accused the Southern State of supporting the rebel groups. Nevertheless, 
according to the British newspaper, UNAMID said that about 178,000 people had 
returned to West Darfur from January 2011 until March 2012, “which wouldn't have 
happened if security hadn't improved” (Tran, 2012). 
The situation in the rest of the Darfur areas, nonetheless, was not improving. In 
June 2013, more than 100,000 people had to flee from the Jebel Amir area of North Darfur 
due to the emerging violence between the Abbala —camel shepherds— and Beni Hussein 
—cattle shepherds— tribes (UN News Service, 2013). Amnesty International (2013) 
described in their annual report that the conflict continued in in Darfur, Southern 




Arrest warrants filed by the ICC 
With the regard to international justice, Amnesty International (2013) denounced 
that the Government of Sudan “remained uncooperative” with the arrest warrants of the 
ICC against President al-Bashir in 2009 and 2010, Ahmed Haroun, Governor of Southern 
Kordofan, and the former janjaweed militia leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, 
both in 2007. On 1 March, another warrant arrest was issued by the ICC in Darfur; on this 
occasion against Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, the current Governor of Khartoum 
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State who was the Minister of National Defense at that time, for 41 counts of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes apparently committed in Darfur (Amnesty International, 
2013). 
One year after that the International Criminal Court issued that last warrant arrest, 
on 12 December 2014, ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda suspended her investigations into 
war crimes in Darfur as a consequence of the lack of action and support by the UN 
Security Council; according to analysts, an action is “unlikely because China —which 
wields a veto— has traditionally supported Sudan” (BBC, 2014). In accordance with 
Human Rights Watch (2016), President Bashir announced the resumption of “Operation 
Decisive Summer”, a military campaign led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that 
began in February 2014 against armed rebel groups in Darfur. 
 
Four more years as the head of the Government 
On 27 April 2015, Omar al-Bashir extended his 26-year presidency with 94.5% 
of the votes, as covered by David Smith (2015) in The Guardian, “boycotted by major 
opposition parties and denounced by western governments as lacking credibility”; and 
the US, Britain and Norway criticised Khartoum for its “failure to create a free, fair and 
conducive elections environment”. According to Human Rights Watch (2016), 2015 was 
marked by the ongoing “violent intercommunal fighting”, especially in South Darfur. 
Amnesty International (2016) reported in September 2016 that “evidence strongly 
suggests that Sudanese government forces repeatedly used chemical weapons during 
attacks in Jebel Marra.” To reach that conclusion, the London-based non-governmental 
organization interviewed 52 survivors of the alleged attacks by government forces in 
Jebel Marra (West Darfur) from January until September 2016 and consulted two 
chemical weapons experts (Amnesty International, 2016). 
Another controversial fact at the time was the ‘2016 Darfurian status referendum’ 
held on 11-13 April to determine the administrative status of the region; a referendum 
whose completion had been agreed in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The 
Commission announced that the ‘five states option’ won with 98 percent (3,081,976) of 
the votes over the option to unify the states and, thus, the North Sudanese government 
announced that ‘Darfur Regional Authority’ would not be extended. The referendum was 
a subject of controversy due to its rejection of displaced and refugees, civil society 
organisations, armed movements, and political forces from Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 
2016). 
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Current years: the fall of the Omar al-Bashir regime 
An event that one can underline about the is that the US permanently lifted a range 
of sanctions and an economic imposed to Sudanese Government embargo in October 
2017, arguing that the African Union had started to address concerns about the human 
rights abuses and terrorism committed in Darfur (Morello, 2017). The strategy of the 
Trump administration changed from relying on sanctions to encouraging changes and 
responds to geopolitical factors such as the aim of diplomatically isolating North Korea, 
by enlisting Sudan, and the fact that Israel and Saudi Arabia had urged the US to 
encourage Sudan in order to distance it from Iran, in the words of Carol Morello (2017) 
in The Washington Post. 
However, the present situation is conditioned with the result of the protest that 
broke out against Bashir in the north east of the State in December 2018 over the hike in 
bred prices. As explained by France 24 (2019), the wave of protest erupted on 19 
December in central Atbara (northeastern Sudan), where protesters said “no to hunger” 
and set fire the National Congress Party (NCP) headquarters, and it was spread to other 
cities such as Khartoum to call on the army for support. Curiously, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the 
main opposition leader and last democratically elected prime minister, returned to Darfur 
after almost a year in self-imposed exile and gave a public speech in Khartoum, as 
covered by Khalid Abdelaziz (2018) in Reuters. 
At the start of the month, on 4 December, the Parliament of North Sudan adopted 
one amendment that extended the presidential term limits and, in consequence, Bashir 
could stand for the 2020 elections. Five days later, the Justice and Equality Movement 
and Sudan Liberation Movement/Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) signed a pre-negotiation 
agreement with the Sudanese government (International Crisis Group, 2018). Meanwhile, 
between 9 and 12 December, the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel 
(AUHIP) set the peace roadmap amendments consultations in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 
but they were suspended since AUHIP only wanted to meet with the National Umma 
Party (NUP); the JEM, the SLM/MM and some groups such as the Sudanese Congress 
Party and the rebel group SPLM-N-Agar were excluded (Radio Dabanga, 2018c). 
As reported by International Crisis Group (2019a), the humanitarian organizations 
claim that there had been at least 40 deaths and 2,000 people detained by January as 
security forces responded to the protests with brutality by reportedly using tear gas and 
live rounds and targeting the medical workers that would care the injured protesters. In 
response and after a doctor was killed in the protests on 17 January, the Central 
Committee of Sudanese Doctors announced a strike on 20 January by serving only in the 
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hospitals that are not owned by the government, according to Almayl and Topcu (2019) 
in Anadolu Agency. 
Jehanne Henry (2019) reported on 10 January in Human Rights Watch that the 
day before “government security forces responded to peaceful demonstrations with live 
ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas, killing at least three protesters and injuring 
several others”. Those forms of violence were repeated in the following weeks, according 
to a video published by Human Rights Watch (2019) on 11 February, in which one can 
see “forces driving around in armed vehicles, shooting bullets and tear gas at unarmed 
protesters, and rounding up and brutally beating protesters and bystanders with sticks and 
gun butts”. 
Regarding political measures, Bashir declared state of emergency on 22 February, 
dissolved the cabinet and replaced eighteen provincial governors by army and intelligence 
officials. A few days later, on 1 March, the President ceded his leadership in the National 
Congress Party (NCP) to Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, the deputy head of NCP, until the 
following general conference of the party (International Crisis Group, 2019b). A new 
cabinet was announced by Mohamed Tahir Ayala, Prime Minister of Sudan from 23 
February 2019 to 11 April 2019, on 13 March, which was principally composed of NCP 
ministers. Regarding the new leadership, on 30 March, NCP suspended the general 
conference of the party in which a new leader should have been elected (International 
Crisis Group, 2019c). 
“It has fallen. We have won”, the crowd shouted when President Omar Al-Bashir 
was forced out of power on 11 April (The Economist, 2019). The military ouster of Bashir 
ended up with a 30 year regime, marking a before and after in the whole state. A 
noteworthy fact is that women played an important role in those civil protests, which has 
got the attention of international media.  
“Alaa Salah, a 22-year-old Sudanese woman, has become an icon of the country’s 
uprising”, reported Sadek (2019) in Vox Media in relation to a viral picture captured by 
Lana Haroun, a local photographer, that shows a young activist and journalist standing at 
the top a white car surrounded by a crowd of people protesting near the presidential 
compound and the army headquarters in Khartoum.  Mohamed (2019) reports on Al 
Jazeera that the image of Salah “represents the fact that, for months, Sudanese women 
have been at the forefront of protests and sit-ins against al-Bashir”.  
Elbagir, McKenzie, Bashir, Nasir and Abdalaziz (2019) reported on CNN that, in 
the early months of the protests, the soldiers had tried to intimidate the female activists 
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“by threatening to ruin their reputations” so that they would stay at home. Some activists 
were taken to secret detention, raped, threatened with sexual violence and photographed 
naked, according to the statements gathered in the CNN report. 
Turning to the military coup, the same day Bashir was removed out of the power, 
the Armed Forces announced the formation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC) that 
would be headed by Defense Minister Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf as well as a house arrest 
against Bashir (Sudan Daily, 2019). Nonetheless, Sudan’s transitional military council 
said that he would not be extradited to the  ICC (Reuters, 2019). According to Africa 
News (2019), Bashir was moved to Khartoum prison on 17 April. Two weeks later, on 2 
May, the Prosecutor officially started probing him of suspicion of money laundering and 
financing terrorism (Reuters, 2019). 
On 12 April, the head of the TMC, Awad Ibn Auf, indicated in a press conference 
in Khartoum that the military would not intervene in the future government’s formation, 
as reported by the Sudan Tribune (2019). However, Awad Ibn Auf served as the de facto 
Head of State just for one day. Protesters refused to leave the streets because of Ibn Auf’s 
relation to Bashir and his actions in Darfur and, in consequence, the Lieutenant General 
Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan was announced as the new head of the Transitional 
Military Council by Ibn Auf in a speech broadcast on state television (Giordano, 2019). 
Jen Kirby (2019) contextualised in Vox Media that Auf was “also tainted by war 
crimes allegations” since he served as the head of military intelligence during the conflict 
in Darfur and, for that reason, the US Treasury Department sanctioned him. Auf was 
sanctioned sentenced together with Ahmad Muhammed Harun, Sudan's State Minister for 
Humanitarian Affairs, for allegedly having “provided the Janjaweed with logistical 
support and directed attacks” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007). 
Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf is not the only member of the TMC that has been pointed 
out because of their relations with the janjaweed, which makes one lose hope about the 
future of Darfur. On 13 April, Burhan named Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, head 
of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as the deputy head of the Transitional Military 
Council (International Crisis Group, 2019d). Human Rights Watch (2015) describes 
Dagolo not only as the RSF leader, but also as a “Janjaweed militia leader”. In the twenty-
first report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), Dagolo is pointed for “retaining overall command and control” of alleged 
ground attacks which affected civilians (International Criminal Court, 2005b). 
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As described in the Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur published on 10 April, the situation in Darfur was 
“relatively stable, with the exception of Jebel Marra”, where clashes between the 
Sudanese Armed Forces and the SLA-AW faction as well as among the rebel groups 
continued (United Nations Security Council, 2019: 1). In the analysis, it is said that the 
anti-Government protests that began on 19 December 2018 have had a limited impact in 
Darfur did not disrupt the Darfur peace process. In fact, the UN Security Council (2019) 
indicated that Bashir had announced in January an open-ended cessation of hostilities in 
Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and so did the SRF by extending their unilateral 
cessation over three months from 8 February 2019. However, it remains to be seen how 
those promises are fulfilled.  
In short and at the present, the ICC has opened five cases and issued six arrest 
warrants in Darfur. The cases are against Harun and Kushayb, Minister of State for the 
Interior of the Government of Sudan and alleged janjaweed leader, respectively, at that 
time; Omar al-Bashir, who, as mentioned before, received two arrest warrants; Abu 
Garda, Chairman and General Coordinator of Military Operations of the United 
Resistance Front at the time of warrant; Abdallah Banda, Commander-in-Chief of JEM; 
and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Minister of National Defense at that time 
(International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
In the case of Omar al-Bashir, Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb and Abdel Raheem 
Muhammad Hussein, they will be at large and the cases will remain in Pre-Trial stage 
unless they are arrested and transferred to the Court in The Hague. Bashir is accused of 
five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes and three counts of 
genocide, while Harun is accused of 20 counts of crimes against humanity and 22 counts 
of war crimes, Kushayb of 22 counts of crimes against humanity and 28 counts of war 
crimes, and Hussein of seven counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war 
crimes (International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
In contrast, the three charges of war crimes against Abu Garda were rejected by 
the Prosecutor in 2010 and the case is considered closed. Regarding the situation of 
Abdallah Banda, who is suspected of committing three war crimes, the JEM chief at the 
time of warrant is at large as well. However, Banda appeared voluntarily the Pre-Trial 
stage of his case and his case is in Trial, which will start if he gets arrested or voluntarily 
appears at the court (International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
 
 




The reasons behind the clashes between the janjaweed militia and the two main 
rebel groups, the JEM and the SLM/SLA, during the Darfur conflict are not cultural nor 
religious, but political in terms of wealth sharing. As exposed before, the Islam is the 
majority religion in all the different Darfurian tribes and, despite the fact that some tribes 
have their own languages, the Arabic is the preponderant language (United Nations 
Secretary-General, 2005). Therefore, the first hypothesis proposed in the paper is not 
fulfilled. 
The Sudanese Government would refer to tribal conflicts between the Arab and 
the African identity tribes in order to deny the crimes committed by their aligned militia 
(Langa, 2017). In contrast, both the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice Equality Movement (JEM) base the grounds of their armed activity on political, 
social and economic reasons. The SLM/A (2013) defines in their Political Declaration 
that their objective is to “to create a united democratic Sudan on a new basis of equality, 
complete restructuring and devolution of power, even development, cultural and political 
pluralism and moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese”. Along the same lines, the 
JEM (2015) broadly bases their Peace Proposal on the commitment to human rights, the 
involvement in power and civil services and the participation in public wealth by all the 
Sudanese. 
Moreover, when it comes to the manner that the janjaweed militiamen perpetuate 
their assaults, the conflict adopts an ethnic approach; which, at the same time, confirms 
the third hypothesis: The violence in Darfur can be framed as a genocide. 
In accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
a genocide is any kind of killing, physical or mental harm and other measures such as 
preventing births, transferring children or inflicting on a group’s conditions of life with 
the intention of destroying a national, ethnical, racial or religious group either partially or 
wholly. 
Authors such as Christian (2013) have described that the ethnic differences within 
the tribes from Darfur are not as significant. For that reason, one may think that, as the 
ethnic distinctions are minimal, there cannot be an ethnic genocide but, nonetheless, the 
targeted groups were from the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Jebel, Aranga and other African 
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identity tribes in the vast majority of the cases (United Nations Secretary-General, 2005). 
According to the above-mentioned report by Olsson (2010), the population from the Fur, 
Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes decreased by 57 percent, while the groups from other tribes 
increased in the 542 analysed villages in southwestern Darfur. 
Moreover, organism such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2005) reported that the victims of the janjaweed were abused with racist language, 
since the militiamen allegedly yelled insults such as “Blacks” and “slaves” to their 
victims. As manifested above in ‘Dehumanization racial epithets’, the use of insults of 
ethnic nature was reported on several occasions. 
Finally, the last fact to prove that a genocide was committed in Darfur is that 
officials of the Sudanese Government, janjaweed militiamen and Resistance Front leaders 
are precisely in charge of genocide and Omar al-Bashir is the first person to be charged 
for the crime of genocide by the ICC (International Criminal Court, 2005a). 
Regarding the second hypothesis —The Government of Sudan is supporting the 
janjaweed militia—, documents published by Human Rights Watch prove that the 
Sudanese Government allowed the activities of the janjaweed and even provided them 
weapons (Flint, 2009), thus, there is a correlation between the government and the militia. 
As previously noted, the janjaweed militia is a “paramilitary oriented force with a 
hierarchical structure, supported and in service of the interests of Jartum” (Flint and De 
Waal, 2007; as cited in Langa 2017: 104).  
From an approach focused on the gender, it can be argued that women are men 
are affected the conflict in different manners and, therefore, the fourth hypothesis arises; 
the victims are targeted in a different way depending on their gender. 
The conflict in Darfur is characterised by massive rapes and other ways of sexual 
violence against women as a war strategy. In most of the cases documented by the high 
reliability organizations, the victims of sexual violence were women and girls living in 
IDPs and, in many cases, they were raped when they left the camp to collect firewood or 
grass or were travelling to a major town (United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2005). 
 In The Devil Came on Horseback (2007), it is described that women would gather 
firewood because if the men left the camps, they could be castrated or killed; which shows 
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that there were particular acts of violence against women and men. Furthermore, taking 
advantage of the stigma against rape in Sudan, those women who were raped were “often 
pregnant and literally scarred to mark them as raped” so that they would not be accepted 
in their communities (Martin, 2007: 2). 
 Moreover, the mentioned CNN report by Elbagir, McKenzie, Bashir, Nasir and 
Abdalaziz (2019) points out that the sexual violence is currently being used in an intent 
to silence the female activist that participate in the anti-government protests in Sudan, 
where women are allegedly raped, threatened with sexual violence and photographed 
naked. 
 Finally, the fifth raised hypothesis has been fulfilled: The international 
community has failed to mediate in Darfur. Both the African Union and the United 
Nations hybrid operation (UNAMID) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have 
been  unsuccessful in achieving the peace in Darfur. 
 First, the African Union Mission (AMIS) was deployed in the region in 2004 in 
order to secure the environment for the humanitarian aid organizations, to ensure that the 
refugees and the internally displaced people could return to their homes and to “monitor 
and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and 
assist in the process of confidence building” (2010: 57). Nevertheless, the conflict didn’t 
cease, people continued being displaced and, according to the United Nations, about 85% 
of the 900,000 people were inaccessible to humanitarian aid (Physicians for Human 
Rights, 2006). 
 The hybrid AU-UN mission, UNAMID, and the ICC were not successful either. 
Regarding the lack of effectiveness of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, most of 
the people remark “the extent to which the government is seen to control their activities; 
and, to a lesser extent, the force’s lack of resources”. (International Refugee Rights 
Initiative, 2016: 18).  
When it comes to the International Criminal Court’s attempts to solve the conflict 
in Darfur by sentencing the perpetrators of the crimes, the Sudanese Government was not 
cooperative with the addressed arrest warrants and, thus, the charges were ineffective 
(Amnesty International, 2013). Even now that President Bashir has been expelled from 
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the government, the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC) has stated that they 
will not extradite him to the  ICC (Reuters, 2019). 
It is to be noted as well that  the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda suspended her 
investigations into war crimes in Darfur in 2014 because of the lack of action and support 
by the UN Security Council (BBC, 2014). Moreover, after the ICC arrest warrants, the 
President travelled to African Union member countries such as Chad and Kenya without 
any consequence, which places in evidence the absence of cooperation with the 
International Criminal Court by those states (Clarke, 2010; Borger, 2010; as cited in 
Barnes, 2011). 
As explained above, at the present time, there International Criminal Court has 
four open cases against four people in Darfur for alleged crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide: against Omar al-Bashir, for five counts of crimes against humanity, 
two counts of war crimes and three counts of genocide; Ahmad Harun, for 20 counts of 
crimes against humanity and 22 counts of war crimes; Ali Kushayb, for 22 counts of 
crimes against humanity and 28 counts of war crimes; Abdel Raheem Muhammad 
Hussein, seven counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war crimes; and 
Abdallah Banda, for three war crimes. Nevertheless, as the ICC “does not try individuals 
in their absence”, they will not be charged unless they are arrested or they surrender 
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